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Housing and Domestic Abuse Victims:
Three Proposals for Reform in Minnesota
Ethan Breneman Lauer*
Introduction
The unrelenting winter of 1989 witnessed the continued vic-
timization of "Margaret," a mother of several young children. In
the fall of that year, Margaret's boyfriend assaulted her in her
home.' Unfortunately for Margaret, she rented her home, and
four days before Christmas her landlord attempted to evict 2 her for
failing to prevent that assault.3 Concerning the assault, the land-
lord told Margaret that the residents of her building "cannot toler-
ate such behavior."4
The Minnesota district court hearing the case viewed the
matter differently. The court felt that the landlord could not evict
Margaret for "permitting" an assault on herself.5 This decision
seems normatively correct not only because it kept a family out of
the cold, but because it also reflects an instinctual disdain for
punishment inflicted for being a victim. The decision also seems
* J.D. expected 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. My gratitude to Lawrence McDonough for many of the ideas,
insights and arguments in this Article, to Law & Inwquality editors Ben Weiss and
Lori Schneider for their assistance, and to Erin Morrissey for her love, support and
encouragement.
1. West Bank Homes v. "M.K.," No. 1891221520, slip op. at 2 (4th Dist. Ct.
Minn. Jan. 22, 1990) (order denying reconsideration) (party's name withheld to
protect identity).
2. See infra note 72.
3. Id. Margaret cooperated with the Hennepin County Attorney's Office in
prosecuting the boyfriend for felonious assault and burglary. Id. The boyfriend
was still in custody at the time of the attempted eviction. Id.
4. Doug Grow, When Victim Is Seen as the Villain, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Dec. 29, 1989, at lB. Such "intolerable" behavior included calling the police ten
times on her boyfriend, including twice on the autumn day when police finally ar-
rested him. Id.
5. See West Bank Homes v. 'M.K.," No. 1891221520, slip op. at 3. "Plaintiff
failed to state a valid ground for termination. 'Permitting' an assault on oneself
will not suffice as a valid termination ground .... Id. Another judge echoed this
sentiment saying, "[iut would be a real injustice to blame her for the terrible dis-
ruption and violence she has been experiencing." Grow, supra note 4, at 1B
(quoting Hennepin County District Judge Isabel Gomez).
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remarkable in that it reflects a situation thousands of Minnesota
women could someday face, and beckons the recognition of a de-
fense to public and private housing evictions based on the truth
about the situation of domestic abuse victims. 6
Although victims of abuse have many needs, retaining hous-
ing is one of the most critical. As victims of domestic abuse face
constant insecurity and uncertainty, 7 having assurance of retain-
ing a rented dwelling may help victims view the home in its role as
comforter and refuge. 8 Also, if the victim shares children with her
abuser, the allocation of housing may assist her in a custody pro-
ceeding as courts do not always give dispositive weight to abuse.9
6. This Article uses the term "domestic abuse victims" because it draws focus
away from the woman and toward the fact that a crime was committed against
her. See Mary Schouvieller, Leaping Without Looking: Chapter 142's Impact on Ex
Parte Protection Orders and the Movement Against Domestic Violence in Minne-
sota, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 593, 594 n.3 (1996). Legal practitioners are prone to use
the phrase 'tattered women" with "assumptions about battered women based on
their own values and self-protective expectations (e.g., "I would never let a man hit
me.")." Julie Blackman, "Battered Women" What Does This Phrase Really Mean?,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. (Civic Research Inst., Kingston, N.J.), Dec./Jan. 1996, at
5, 11. Further, as physical battering is but one part of the problem, the phrase
"domestic abuse" signifies that a relationship does not have to be violent to be abu-
sive and encompasses in the discussion a larger pool of victims. "Domestic vio-
lence," a subset of abuse, may then be used when referring specifically to physical
acts.
7. See LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL
AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 65 (1989) ("To be sure, continual, unpredictable inse-
curity in the presence of ever-building violence must dramatically influence the
way a human being views the world."). See also Mary Ann Dutton & Catherine L.
Waltz, Domestic Violence: Understanding Why It Happens and How to Recognize
It, 17 FAM. ADvOC. 14, 18 (1995) (explaining that the psychological effects of abuse
include "distrust of others" and "a belief that the world is unsafe").
8. See generally Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for Domestic Violence: A Con-
tinuing Challenge, J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 335 (1994); cf. Mitchell v. United
States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 569 F. Supp. 701, 708 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(discussing how constant relocation prevents establishing the security and stabil-
ity needed to transform a residence into a home); Donna M. Moore, Editor's Intro-
duction: An Overview of the Problem, in BATTERED WOMEN 7, 10 (Donna Moore ed.,
1979) ("Traditionally, the home is where people retreat for safety, love, and sol-
ace.").
9. See Joan Zorza, Protecting a Battered Woman's Whereabouts from Disclo-
sure, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. (Civic Research Inst., Kingston, N.J.), Oct./Nov.
1995, at 1, 3 ('[A] distressing number of... cases, some decided as late as the
1990s, have found that a father's violence against his female partner, even when it
results in her death, is not relevant to the custody determination."). See also Sny-
der, supra note 8, at 349:
[B]attered women have still experienced considerable difficulties in cus-
tody battles with abusive husbands. This in large part stems from a fairly
recent trend by which courts have looked to the 'best interests of the child'
when deciding issues of child custody. And strangely, a 'est interests"
analysis often favors male batterers.
See also Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
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However, retaining housing is also problematic in Minnesota. The
financial hardships of many abuse victims make them likely to
seek federally assisted housing,10 but the availability of such
rental housing has decreased in recent years in Minnesota." The
private housing market in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area seems
similarly restrictive, with rising rent and low vacancy. 12
This Article outlines three proposals for addressing the
housing problems faced by victims of domestic abuse in Minnesota.
Part I lays out the scope and pertinent facets of domestic abuse,
including views on a victim's inability to predict or control an
abuser's behavior and the unrecognized difficulty of leaving an
abusive relationship. Part II provides a basic outline of housing
law and describes how the present structure works to the disad-
vantage of, among others, victims of domestic abuse. Part III first
traces the evolution of Minnesota's present strict liability standard
for deciding evictions and then suggests a defense of
"foreseeability" and control for tenants when their abusive part-
ner's behavior prompts an eviction proceeding against the victim.
Part IV argues that Minnesota should supplement its Domestic
Abuse Act to facilitate the eviction of only the abusive partner
when victim and abuser are co-tenants. Part V suggests a rent
substitution scheme to assist victims in meeting their rent obliga-
tion after the removal of the abusive partner.
HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1503 (1993) [hereinafter Developments] ("[I]n child custody
proceedings, battered women must fight cultural perceptions that they are weak
and dysfunctional, and thus are unfit to be mothers."). But see In re Welfare of
Scott, 244 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 1976) (considering a father's violent acts directed
against the mother as relevant to termination of parental rights proceedings);
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(6)(a)(4) (1996) (allowing courts granting temporary custody
to give primary consideration to the safety of the children).
10. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
11. Compare CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, OFFICE OF THE CITY COORDINATOR
PLANNING DEP'T, STATE OF THE CITY 1984, at 37 (1985) (finding a twelve percent
public housing vacancy rate in Minneapolis), with CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS PLANNING
DEP'T, STATE OF THE CITY 1995, at 37 (1996) (finding a two percent vacancy rate).
See also Eila Savela, Homelessness and the Affordable Housing Shortage: What Is
to Be Done?, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 279, 313 (1991) (noting a "chronic" shortage of
housing for the poor). But cf. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of
Homelessness, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 428 (1991) (recognizing that appli-
cants who have been "involuntarily displaced" by a household member's violence
receive priority consideration in federal housing programs).
12. See Rent Sampler, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 8, 1997, at H27




I. The Abuse Problem
A. Scope and Nature
Society has long allowed men to physically harm their inti-
mate partners, with neither legal censure 13 nor moral disap-
proval 14 readily forthcoming. Despite recent legal reforms, 15 the
persistence of violence in the home results in an untold amount of
suffering. 16
13. See History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the
Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 983-97 (1989) (tracing the
history of abuse from the Roman empire through twentieth century United
States). See also Developments, supra note 9, at 1502 ("United States law con-
doned wife abuse ... through the mid-nineteenth century.").
The history of social approval or acquiescence in woman battering can be
traced to the common law. See Birgit Schmidt am Busch, Domestic Violence and
Title III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3 (1995) ('The common law criterion for measuring
moderate chastisement, the 'rule of thumb,' permitted a husband to discipline his
wife by beating her, so long as the stick he used was no thicker than his thumb.");
see also MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & BEVERLY BALOS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 196 (1994) (citing State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (Phil. Law 1868)). In Rho-
des, court upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss an assault and battery charge
against a husband because, "[h]is honor was of the opinion that the defendant has
a right to whip his wife with a switch no larger than his thumb .... Id. See also
Joan Zorza, Using the Law to Protect Battered Women and Their Children, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1437, 1442 (1994) (also discussing the "rule of thumb").
Writing in 1992, domestic abuse victim Sarah Buel recalled a "time 15 years ago
when there were no abuse prevention laws, no battered women shelters .... [and
no] courts that I could find [which] were at all interested in my safety .. " Sarah
M. Buel, Legal Services Must Improve Responses to Violence Against Women,
REPORTER (Mass. Legal Serv. Corp.), Feb. 1992, at 1, 4.
14. Consider the events that followed attorney Sarah Buel's attempted flight
from abuse:
I was in a laundromat on a Saturday morning ... and I saw people over
by the counter, so I felt reasonably safe. . . .And then I saw my ex-
husband come in the door .... [a]nd I look over to the counter, and I ask
the people to call the police .... I still had bruises on the side of my face,
and I said, "This is the person who did this to me, you need to call the po-
lice!" And he said, "No, this is my wife, we've just had a little fight and
I've come to take her home." So nobody moved. As long as I live, I want
to remember what it feels like to be terrified for my life and nobody can
even pick up the phone.
Buel, supra note 13, at 5, 16. Writing in 1976, Del Martin observed that "[No one
wants to become involved in what is commonly referred to as a 'domestic situa-
tion."' DELMARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 3 (1981).
15. All states provide criminal and civil relief for victims of spousal abuse. See,
e.g., Zorza, supra note 11, at 422.
16. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (citing state and national es-
timates of the number of spousal abuse victims). Minnesota legal aid providers
believe that the problem is so widespread that they instruct attorneys and client
interviewers to assume "that ANY woman coming into or calling your office could
be a battered woman," and "that domestic abuse could be a factor in ANY legal
problem a client might present." MINNESOTA LEGAL SERV. COALITION, FOR ALL
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Women are the overwhelming targets of domestic abuse in
the United States. 17 Between two and four million American
women are battered annually. 8 Battering is the largest cause of
injury to women, 19 and more than half of all American women are
victimized at some time in their lives.20 Despite these alarming
numbers, friends and neighbors of victims often forgive assailants
and make excuses for them.21 Many perpetrators, perhaps feeding
on societal acquiescence, do not consider their behavior illegal. 22
In the face of such absolution, many victims also fail to see crimi-
nality in their partners' behavior.2 3
Besides the physical injuries, 24 abusers cause emotional dam-
age. 25 An abuser can also cause financial problems by harassing a
victim at work until she is fired. 26 Loretta Frederick, while an at-
LEGAL SERVICES STAFF 1 (1995).
17. See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, DOMESTIC ABUSE PROTECTION PLAN
i (1992) (noting that 95% of domestic abuse victims are women).
18. Snyder, supra note 8, at 336. This equals one woman victimized every fif-
teen seconds. Patricia M. Moen, Domestic Abuse Model Arrest Policy and Re-
sources, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE at iv-15 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. 1994). In
Minnesota, figures from 1991 indicate 132,000 incidents of domestic violence.
MARTIN J. COSTELLO ET AL., MINNESOTA MISDEMEANORS AND MOVING TRAFFIC
VIOLATIONS 637 (2d ed. 1996). These incidents ended in a Minnesota woman's
death at least one hundred times in the 1990s. Moen, supra, at 18. Nationally,
men kill so many women that Carol Orlock uses the terms "femicide" and
"womanslaughter." Diana E.H. Russell, Introduction to DEL MARTIN, BATTERED
WIVES, supra note 14, at x.
19. Snyder, supra note 8, at 336.
20. Moen, supra note 18, at 15.
21. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 14, at 1-5. A letter of an abuse victim which
recounts how clergy, friends, doctors, and police told her that she should be "more
tolerant" because her husband "meant no real harm." Id. at 2-3. She hears this
after being "whipped, kicked and thrown, picked up again and thrown down
again[,] ... punched and kicked in the head, chest, face, and abdomen more times
than [she] can count." Id. at 1-2.
22. See Zorza, supra note 11, at 428.
23. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Representing a Victim of Domes-
tic Violence, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 25, 28 (1995). See also Buel, supra note 13, at 17 ("So
many women . . . still have no idea that the abuse is illegal.") U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS IN MINNEAPOLIS 3 (1977) ('There is
reason to believe that incidents of assault stemming from domestic quarrels are
underreported in victimization surveys because some victims do not consider such
events crimes ... ").
24. Attorney and former victim Sarah Buel provides grisly examples:
They have their teeth knocked out with hammers; they are run over by
cars and trucks; they are raped with hot curling irons and large objects.
They are beaten, stabbed, choked, [and] strangled. ... [A]nd they are tied
up and forced to watch the torture and sexual molestation of their own
children.
Buel, supra note 13, at 1.
25. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 23, at 28.
26. See FELLOWS & BALOS, supra note 13, at 216. See also Zorza, supra note
11, at 424. "Abusive husbands and lovers harass 74 percent of employed battered
19971
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torney with the Battered Women's Legal Advocacy Project in Wi-
nona, Minnesota, succinctly explained how an abuser can infiltrate
many aspects of a victim's life:
Battering is a multi-faceted pattern of control, punctuated
and buttressed by physical violence. It is not an isolated
physical assault, nor even a series of assaults. Battered
women nearly always experience many forms of violent and
other controlling behavior by the batterer. Taken together,
these acts cause the woman's life, or parts thereof, to be sub-
ject to her abuser's whim or desire. Accordingly, she is forced
to negotiate for her daily needs in a climate of fear of every-
thing from assaults to insults. 27
Victims of domestic abuse struggle within this framework of
invasive and pervasive control every day. Not only do abusers
thoroughly control victims, some victim advocates discourage
women from engaging in forceful resistance to violent controlling
behavior for fear increased harm will befall the victim. 28 While the
victim alone knows why she must "negotiate for her daily needs," a
brief exploration of three important yet frequently misunderstood
aspects of domestic abuse may help others begin to understand
how a victim might view the world.
B. Domestic Abuse From the Victim's Perspective
1. The Victim as an Innocent Party
Many people falsely assign victims partial responsibility for
violence in the home, assuming that the victim must provoke the
abuser, enjoy the abuse or participate in the violence. 29 Perhaps
society assumes that adult women involved with abusive relation-
ships must contribute to their creation. 30 However, two prevalent
women at work .... causing ... 54 percent to miss at least three full days of work
a month, and 20 percent to lose their jobs." Id. (footnotes omitted).
27. Loretta M. Frederick, Effective Advocacy on Behalf of Battered Women, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE at vi-1 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. 1992). See also BALOS &
FELLOWS, supra note 13, at 216 (explaining how a woman who is told the abuse is
"her fault" and whose family does not intercede will feel as helpless as if she did
not exist).
28. See Margaret Gregory, Battered Wives, in VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 107,
109 (Maria Borland ed., 1976) Cf. Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 17 (noting
study which found that twenty-three percent of victims who engaged in self-
protective behavior indicated that their situation worsened).
29. See Beverly C. Dusso, Anatomy of a Shelter, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE at vi-6
(Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. 1994) (listing as two myths about family violence that
"[b]attered women are masochistic" and "[v]ictims provoke the violence"); see also
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 373 (N.J. 1984) (citing expert's opinion that society
widely holds the fallacious belief that women enjoy being beaten).
30. See FELLOWS & BALos, supra note 13, at 217 (noting that adult victims,
unlike children, are ignored because of the belief that an adult woman "wants it,
[Vol. 15:471
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characterizations of domestic abuse place sole responsibility for
the initiation of violence with abusers.
First, violent relationships are characterized by the "great
power disparities."3 1 These disparities mean that perpetrators dic-
tate when relationships become violent, rather than an individual
victim's demeanor or conduct fostering an abusive atmosphere.
32
Second, many experts view domestic violence as gender-based.
33
Reacting to deeply-ingrained societal norms, men as a class domi-
nate women as a class, 34 and therefore a woman's "role" in insti-
gating domestic violence consists only of her gender, not her con-
duct. Under this assessment, domestic violence is not men and
women consensually settling a difference with fists; it is men con-
trolling women by committing violent crimes against them. There-
fore, both the "power disparity" and the "gender-based" explana-
tions exonerate victims of blame for the consequences of abusive
relationships.
2. Victims' Inability to Foresee and Prevent Abuse
Although society may perceive that victims consciously enter
relationships with men they know to be batterers,3 5 many victims
do not foresee that a new partner will one day become violent.
36
likes it, or chooses it"); see also WALKER, supra note 7, at 132-35 (describing one
prosecutor's mistaken belief that a woman severely sexually abused by her partner
enjoyed the violent relationship).
31. Klein & Orloff, supra note 23, at 28.
32. Joan Zorza, Most Therapists Need Training in Domestic Violence, DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE REP., Aug./Sept. 1996, at 2. Cf. Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at
17 ("[Olnce the violence starts, only the batterer can stop it.").
33. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 22-24 (2d ed. 1996); see also Busch, supra note 13, at
23-24. "[F]amily violence is directed toward a specific class of people-women....
[I]n domestic violence cases, a woman would not have been abused had she been a
man." Id. at 24; see also Buel, supra note 13, at 21 (Violence against women...
has to be about misogyny, when [abuse] .. .is 95-to-97 percent male-inflicted on
females.").
34. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 23. See also SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 219-24 (1982) (explaining that while all men are socialized to
dominate women, only some men employ physical force). For a discussion of the
societal roots of domestic violence, see NATIONAL CTR. FOR WOMEN AND FAMILY
LAW, INC., LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR BATTERED WOMEN 3-4 (1982) [hereinafter LEGAL
ADVOCACY]. "'To eliminate the particularly brutal form of violence known as wife-
beating will require changes in the cultural norms and in the organization of the
family and society which underlie the system of violence on which so much of
American society is based."' Id. at 3 (citation omitted). "It seems clear ... that
men beat women because our culture ... implicitly sanctions this behavior." Id. at
4 (citation omitted).
35. See Dusso, supra note 29, at 6.
36. Lenore Walker's story of "Irene" exemplifies a victim who at first found her
1997]
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Since abusers do not necessarily behave abusively in relationships
outside the home,3 7 they give potential victims no warning of fu-
ture violence inside the home.
Even when a woman realizes that the man she married or
lives with is abusing her, she may not know when the abuser will
attack or what he will do. When violent incidents occur without
any act or omission by the victim, women have no opportunity to
forsee an abuser's behavior. 38 One victim explained:
I have been slapped for saying something about politics, for
having a different view about religion, for swearing, for crying,
for wanting to have intercourse .... I have been threatened
when he's had a bad day and when he's had a good day.... No
one has to "provoke" a wife-beater. He will strike out when
he's ready and for whatever reason he has at the moment.39
Similarly, in the context of gender-based domination, domestic
violence can be seen as punishment for violations of social norms.
When the male mind determines the norms, women can never
know for sure which norms men expect them to follow and which
violations will result in violence, thus preventing foresight. 40
Despite these generalizations, the unique circumstances of
every abusive relationship mean that each victim will have a dif-
ferent level of foresight. 41 The fact that a woman anticipates im-
new boyfriend "charming" and was "delighted to have [him] in her life," but who
later learned that "[t]he man whose charming presence had once brightened her
lonely life was progressively turning her daily existence into a hell." WALKER, su-
pra note 7, at 126.
37. See LOUISE ARMSTRONG, THE HOME FRONT: NOTES FROM THE FAMILY WAR
ZONE 5 (1983); Dusso, supra note 29, at 6. Cf. Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 14
("Typically, battered women are not easily recognized, and batterers are even
harder to identify.").
38. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 649 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "foresight" as
"reasonable anticipation of result of certain acts or omissions").
39. MARTIN, supra note 14, at 2-3. See also SCHECHTER, supra note 34, at 221
('Battering may have no immediate antecedent at all. A woman may have done
nothing obvious to insult her husband ...."); Gregory, supra note 28, at 128 n.12
("The first time he beat me was two weeks after we were married. He reckoned I
hadn't cooked the cabbage right. I was so stunned I just went and walked round
the park for hours. You see, I just did not know that things like this could hap-
pen."). Incidents such as these prompted Lenore Walker to ask, "What must it be
like ... going to sleep at night, not knowing if you'll wake up the next morning?"
WALKER, supra note 7, at 64. Walker's insight suggests, that as an extreme exam-
ple, a woman attacked in her sleep cannot possibly have foresight. Walker also
discusses the tougher case in which a woman cannot foresee her abuser's behavior
and where the victim does "not know, from one minute to the next, whether she'll
be faced with her 'good' husband or her 'bad' husband." Id. at 47.
40. See SCHECHTER, supra note 34, at 219. Schechter gives the example of a
husband who broke his wife's wrist because she did not serve him birthday cake
first, as he apparently expected. Id. at 221.
41. Esther Olson, for example, writes of the feelings of a victim named Claire
as she watched her husband become irritated over their stalled car and anticipated
[Vol. 15:471
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pending violence, however, does not give her the ability to prevent
it.
3. The Difficulty of Leaving an Abusive Home or
Relationship
A neutral observer who cannot see the abuser's influence on
the victim's life will invariably ask the question, "Why does she
stay.--a likely manifestation of the "self-protective expectations"
alluded to earlier. 42 The persistence of society's apocryphal belief
that women can readily leave an abusive living arrangement
minimizes the possiblity of abuse victims ever obtaining relief in
housing issues. If the courts believe that a woman can voluntarily
remedy an abuser's lease violations by leaving or asking him to
move out of the shared home, then courts have no reason to estab-
lish eviction standards based on the actual involuntariness of a
victim's situation. Examining the various pressures on victims of
abuse that make it "all but impossible to leave"43 will demonstrate
the need to assist women trapped in abusive homes.
a. "Separation Assault"44
A major reason women may not leave abusive relationships is
fear of increased violence during the attempted exodus and there-
after.45 Many victims describe the kind of fear they live with every
the beating that soon followed: "Claire felt her stomach knot up. Her throat was
dry. Her head pounded. She felt nauseated. She knew what was coming. She
had seen it before." ESTHER LEE OLSON, No PLACE TO HIDE 12 (1982). Although
Claire knew, from a pattern of prior behavior, at what point her husband would
become so agitated that he would assault her, she did not know on which particu-
lar days it would happen. Id. at 34. In fact, the day referred to above began
"pleasurably," with "no hints of what was to happen." Id. at 11. See also Buel, su-
pra note 13, at 5 ("[B]attered women are the people who know this abuser the best,
and they know when he's giving the clues and the signals that he is serious this
time. That this is the time that he could kill her.").
42. See supra note 6.
43. Buel, supra note 13, at 18.
44. Martha Mahoney developed this term to describe "the assault on the
woman's separation as a specific type of attack that occurs at or after the moment
she decides on a separation or begins to prepare for one." See Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 65 (1991). Mahoney defines "separation assault" as
that attack on the woman's body and volition in which her partner seeks
to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to re-
turn. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she will
live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relationship.
Id.
45. See Buel, supra note 13, at 5. See also Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 17




day as "an agonizing fear of death,"46 and "a bloodcurdling kind [of
terror] that leaves a hole in the pit of the stomach, that makes a
person shake from the inside out."47 That level of trepidation may
actually increase when an abuser threatens a victim he suspects is
trying to leave. 48 Abuse victims have good cause to fear separation
as greater bodily harm often occurs when the woman flees.49 The
abusers' retaliation and escalated violence when a victim tries to
flee50 also frightens some women into returning to the abuser.
b. Economic Factors
An abuser may take advantage of stark economic realities to
augment the force of his physical presence. As a woman, the vic-
tim faces financial difficulties from institutional economic ine-
qualities which increase her dependence on the abuser as a pro-
vider.51 The abuser can also increase his control over the woman
by appropriating control of the household finances. 52 The abuser
may prevent the victim from establishing independent financial
46. Russell, supra note 18, at x.
47. WALKER, supra note 7, at 64.
48. See Busch, supra note 13, at 3 ("Quite often, battered women are ... kept
from leaving by threats of further violence or death if they attempt to leave their
abusers").
49. See Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 17; Buel, supra note 13, at 5; Snyder,
supra note 8, at 346 n.50.
50. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) ("Case histories are re-
plete with instances in which a battered wife left her husband only to have him
pursue her and subject her to an even more brutal attack."); Naomi R. Cahn, Civil
Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody De-
cisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1053 (1991); Mahoney, supra note 44, at 65. See
also Buel, supra note 13, at 5 (recounting the "amazing tenacity that batterers use
in tracking down victims"); see also Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 16
(discussing stalking as a form of abuse designed to "induce the victim to return to
the batterer").
51. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON EMPLOYMENT POL'Y, INCREASING THE EARNINGS
OF DISADVANTAGED WOMEN 7 (1981) (in 1980 women working full time earned only
64% of the salaries of their male counterparts); COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC
STATUS OF WOMEN, PAY EQUITY: THE MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE 4 (1994) ('In 1991
employed women working full-time, year-round had average earnings that
amounted to only 70 percent of the average earnings for men employed full-time,
year-round."); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAw 6-7 (1993) (citing
similar gender salary statistics and noting the further financial plight of black
families, whose average income was half the average income of white families in
1987).
52. See MINNESOTA LEGAL SERV. COALITION, supra note 15, at Appendix A, 1
(noting that an abuser may do the grocery shopping to control both the household's
finances and food supply). An abuser may engage in "economic abuse," such as
preventing the victim from getting or keeping a job, taking her money, or not let-
ting her have access to family income. Id. at Appendix D. See also Dutton &
Waltz, supra note 7, at 16 (listing as examples of economic abuse "accruing debt in
battered woman's name" and "withholding child support payments").
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security53, forcing the woman to choose between staying with him
or "plunging ... into poverty and homelessness.
54
c. Social Factors
From birth, women face social pressure to maintain intimate
relationships. As Loretta Frederick explains, "[the victim] has
been raised to believe that the success or failure of her relationship
is a reflection of her worth as a woman; the battering is charac-
terized as her failure to maintain the relationship."5 5 The victim's
family, even with awareness of the violence, may advise the
woman to remain with the abuser. 56 A victim may also perceive
that the legal system57 and religion 58 consider marital dissolutions
undesirable.
d. Internal Factors
The previous external factors work against a victim as she at-
tempts, or the abuser senses her attempt, to leave the abusive re-
lationship. There are also at least three internal factors that may
keep a victim from seriously considering leaving her abuser. First,
a woman, especially one with her first partner, may not recognize
53. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
54. Maura J. Kelly, A Matter of Life and Death, REPORTER (Mass. Legal Serv.
Corp.), Feb. 1992, at 16. (noting that the standard of living of women almost in-
variably drops after divorce or separation). Id. See also Busch, supra note 13, at
24 ('Women are financially unable to provide for themselves and the children
without the abuser."); Frederick, supra note 27, at 2 ('As she contemplates life
apart from the abuser, she usually finds herself contemplating poverty or at least a
dramatic drop in her standard of living."); Benjamin L. Weiss, Single Mothers'
Equal Right to Parent: A Fourteenth Amendment Defense Against Forced-Labor
Welfare "Reform," 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 215, 226 n.29 (1997) (citing studies showing
high correlation between poverty or welfare receipt by women and separation from
an abusive partner); Zorza, supra note 11, at 421 ('[N]umerous women are forced
to go back to their abusers because of lack of money or housing.").
55. Frederick, supra note 27, at 1-2.
56. Id. at 1. ('[A victim] is usually being pressured, threatened, or cajoled by
the abuser, the abuser's family, and maybe her own family or children to reconcile,
forgive and forget."); see also Snyder, supra note 8, at 341 ('Friends and family
may actually encourage them to stay with their spouse and 'work things out."').
57. Cf. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1956) ("Since the
continuance of the marriage relation is deemed essential to the public welfare, ...
when differences arise between parties to a marriage, no obstacle shall be placed
in the way of their reconciliation."); ARMSTRONG, supra note 37, at 3-4 (criticizing
the double standard of trying to maintain violent homes through counseling, while
encouraging divorce in cases of mere incompatibility between the spouses).
58. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 41, at 17 (quoting one victim's parents: "We
were brought up to believe that it was more of a sin to divorce than to do anything
else.... That's what was instilled in us at church. Separation was just bad. Un-
heard of.") (alteration in original).
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the depravity of the violence in that relationship. 59 The woman
may find this threat to her health and safety particularly difficult
to detect if she grew up in a home where the father was abusive.60
Second, a victim may see any relief from physical abuse as a
sign that the violence has permanently ended. 61 Del Martin relays
a letter from an anonymous victim:
It must be pointed out that while a husband can beat, slap,
or threaten his wife, there are "good days." These days tend to
wear away the effects of the beating. They tend to cause the
wife to put aside the traumas and look to the good... because
the defeat is the beating and the hope is that it will not hap-
pen again.62
The third significant internal factor affecting a victim's abil-
ity to leave stems from the abuser's inducement of "learned help-
lessness" 63 in the victim. This theory refers to a victim's perceived
inability to predict the consequences of her actions. 64 Although life
with the abuser often means daily misery, a victim may fear life
apart from the abuser even more. 65 Lenore Walker explains that a
victim "believes the demons she knows well are probably prefer-
able to the demons she does not know at all."66 Even with these
three internal factors, though, the victim's presence in the home or
the relationship in no way reflects her approval of the abuse.
Leaving simply does not present itself as a viable option.
Each victim is a unique and special person whose life de-
serves individual attention and care. One should feel remorse in-
59. See Nancy Ngo, Relationship Abuse Reports on the Rise, MINN. DAILY, Oct.
16, 1996, at 4, 12 (interviewing Suzanna Short, Assistant Director of the Program
Against Sexual Violence at the University of Minnesota). Short stated that victims
who are in their first relationship "have no basis of comparison to know that abuse
is not part of a healthy relationship." Id.
60. See BUZAwA & BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 45. See also Blackman, supra
note 6, at 15 (quoting a victim as saying, "I saw my father hit my mother. My
husband hit me all through our marriage. I never knew I was a battered
woman .... ).
61. "Women often hope that their partner will change; they may believe his
promises that the abuse will end, because they desperately want that to be true."
LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 34, at 5 (citation omitted); see also Snyder, supra
note 8, at 341 (explaining that during the "honeymoon phase" of the "cycle of vio-
lence" the woman is "thankful for the respite or convinced that she can now control
his anger"); Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 16 (suggesting that a batterer will
strategically employ "occasional indulgences" to animate a victim's longing for an
end to the abuse).
62. MARTIN, supra note 14, at 4.
63. See generally WALKER, supra note 7, at 49-53 (describing the origins of the
theory of'learned helplessness' and the author's contributions to its development).
64. Id. at 50.
65. Id. at 50-51.
66. Id. at 51.
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deed if attempts to generalize among victims should compound any
one woman's struggle with abusive acts--or what have been de-
scribed as "attempts ... to eradicate her identity and her very be-
ing."67  Some common themes, however, do emerge: domestic
abuse affects many women; victims of that abuse do not instigate
it; victims can neither predict nor control their abusers' behavior
and they face a Sisyphean 68 task in leaving the abusive home or
relationship. In addition, many women must also fight to avoid
homelessness, as Margaret had to fight, should a landlord try to
evict them for being beaten.
II. Housing Law and Domestic Violence
Residential rental housing consists of both privately owned 69
and government-owned or -assisted70 housing. While leases gov-
erning the relationship between the private landlord and tenant
may contain any provision not contrary to law or public policy,71
government-controlled leases contain many uniform provisions.
Although the specifics of the eviction 72 standards differ, a
court may not allow the eviction of a tenant unless the tenant has
violated a lease term.73 An abuser's behavior toward his victim
may violate her lease in several ways. A lease may state that the
tenant agrees not to disturb the neighbors' quiet enjoyment of
their premises, or may provide for termination of the lease after a
certain number of police visits to the property. In these situations,
a woman's calls for help to neighbors or police may not only fail to
bring her assistance, 74 they may also bring her to the brink of
homelessness.
67. Olson, supra note 41, at 7.
68. According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus was fated to continually roll a
heavy stone uphill, only to have it roll down again.
69. See infra Part III.A.2.b for a discussion of private housing evictions.
70. See infra Part III.A.2.a for a discussion of public housing evictions.
71. See Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (Minn. 1976).
72. Landlords may only legally evict tenants by asking the court for relief un-
der the theory that a tenant has "unlawfully detained" the land or tenement. See
MINN. STAT. § 566.02 (1996). For simplicity, "eviction" will be used hereinafter to
refer to the process by which a landlord attempts to terminate a lease and remove
tenants from rental property in place of the technical term "unlawful detainer."
73. See infra note 174.
74. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 51-52 (noting extremely low rates
of arrest in police calls for domestic violence in what the authors label a "bias
against arrest"); Klein & Orloff, supra note 23, at 29 ("[Plolice have been hesitant
to arrest perpetrators due in part to their reluctance to intervene in what they
consider to be a family matter.").
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals, despite the actions of other
states' courts and Minnesota's trial courts,75 is presently charting a
dangerous course in its interpretation of the eviction standards.
Although it has not specifically addressed the eviction of an ac-
knowledged domestic abuse victim, the court has nevertheless es-
tablished a test of strict liability whereby any abuse victim brought
before the court to defend an eviction against her for being beaten
will lose her home. In the words of one housing attorney, "the
Court of Appeals has sent a signal to the state's tenants: live by
yourself or get evicted, because as soon as you open your doors to
someone, you will be held liable."7 6
III. Reforming Minnesota's Eviction Standard to Prevent
the Victim's Eviction for the Abuser's Conduct
A. The Problem: The Court of Appeals'Rejection of a
"Foreseeability" Standard and Creation of Strict
Liability Deprives Victims of Domestic Abuse of an
Eviction Defense
1. Origins of Strict Liability: Smallwood
The Minnesota Court of Appeals provided the impetus for
later establishing an eviction standard of strict liability, whereby
the court holds all household members responsible the actions of
any, when it decided Minneapolis Community Development Agency
v. Smallwood.77 The Smallwood court, under facts extremely un-
favorable to the tenant, upheld the eviction of a public housing
75. When these courts have recognized a tenant's status as victim, they have
denied the eviction. See Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341 (W.
Va. 1988). In Porter, the tenant's boyfriend roused her from sleep with a beating
that allegedly disturbed the neighbors. Id. at 342. The court refused to uphold an
eviction for this incident because the "boisterous behavior [was] beyond the control
of the lessee." Id. at 343 (emphasis added). The court refused to evict the tenant
despite its dissatisfaction with her failure to take steps to exclude the man from
the premises. Id. See also Stock v. Beaulieu, No. C1-95-39, (9th Dist. Ct. Minn.,
Mar. 9, 1995). In Stock, the court addressed a man's attempted eviction of his fe-
male co-habitor after he had been convicted of inflicting bodily harm on her. Id. at
2. The court found the eviction to be retaliatory because it was "intended as a
penalty for Defendant's good faith effort to enforce her rights by reporting a crime
.. in which she [was] the victim." Id. at 3. Significantly, the court allowed the
woman to remain in the home-the "shelter for the parties' child"-even though
her partner owned the house. Id.
76. Interview with Lawrence R. McDonough, Visiting Clinical Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota Law School, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Apr. 18, 1997).
77. 379 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
[Vol. 15:471
HOUSING AND DOMESTIC ABUSE
tenant.78 The court found "good cause"79 to evict the tenant be-
cause of a number of occurrences, ranging from dangerous and dis-
ruptive behavior80 to deterioration of the dwelling,8 1 allegedly in
violation of the lease terms. After noting that neither Smallwood's
behavior nor her home maintenance changed despite warnings
and complaints,8 2 the Smallwood court concluded that "[more
than] six years of such conduct, in direct violation of the lease, is
certainly enough to constitute good cause for eviction."8 3 The court
also suggested that granting an eviction from public housing would
violate due process only when the court deemed the housing
agency's reasons for eviction arbitrary, discriminatory or "mani-
festly improper."8 4
The court of appeals would later rely on Smallwood for the
proposition that Minnesota courts do not inquire into the tenant's
foreseeability and control of the events which cause their evic-
tion.8 5 In that case, Minneapolis Public Housing Authority v. Hol-
loway (Holloway I1),86 the court failed to mention that many of the
78. Id. at 557.
79. Federal statutes and regulations dictate that all governmentally assisted
residential housing leases contain a clause authorizing eviction of tenants only
upon a showing of "serious or repeated violation" of material lease provisions or
other "good cause." See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(4) (1994), 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)
(1996). See infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text and Part III.2.a for further
discussion of this legislation and the judiciary's interpretation of it.
80. The court mentioned the following events which occurred over several
years: starting of fires, loud parties, eggs thrown at other houses, lighting of fire-
crackers, unlawful entry into neighbors' homes, cars driving on lawns, swearing at
neighbors, children spray painting the house, burning furniture, a bullet hole and
"vicious dogs terrorizing and attacking the children in the neighborhood, barking
and running loose, in and out of the windows of the house." Smallwood, 379
N.W.2d at 555-56.
81. In explaining that "Smallwood, her family, and her guests have caused se-
vere damage to the premises," the court noted the following: unkempt lawns, dirty
siding, defective down spouts, spiderwebs, unwashed dishes, dirty stove, roach in-
festation, holes in walls, dog hair and waste in the house, broken bathroom tiles
and "floors that need resanding and varnishing." Id. at 556.
82. "[1It is clear that at least as far back as 1979 Smallwood knew she was in
danger of being evicted for numerous lease violations. Smallwood's behavior did
not change." Id. at 555. In 1981 Smallwood was told that she could not keep her
five dogs, yet she had the dogs as late as December 1984. Id. at 556.
83. Id. The court also rejected the notion that "[slubsequent remedial action
by a tenant can[ ] nullify a prior lease violation," when Smallwood presented evi-
dence at trial of improvement of some objectionable conditions at her residence.
Id.
84. Id. at 557.
85. No. CO-95-391, 1995 WL 479653 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1995)
[hereinafter "Holloway I"]. (interpreting Smallwood to require the housing
authority to show that the tenant has "violated the lease provisions ... and [was]
provide[d] due process" in order to evict).
86. Holloway II, No. CO-95-391, 1995 WL 479653.
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incidents constituting lease violations in Smallwood were arguably
within the tenant's ambit of control, and therefore the Smallwood
court had no reason to articulate a standard of foreseeability. 87
Smallwood knew of the problems associated with her ten-
ancy. The housing authority indicated its disapproval of Small-
wood's behavior by initiating three eviction proceedings in five
years.88 Smallwood was also put on notice of the disruption she
was creating by continual complaints from neighbors.8 9 Small-
wood also could have arguably controlled some of the lease viola-
tions, like the "years of junk and debris scattered on the prem-
ises."90 Therefore, Smallwood, a situation in which the tenant
knew of the problems and could have fixed them, should not con-
trol the case of domestic abuse evictions, where the tenant can nei-
ther foresee91 lease violations nor control them.92
In addition to its misuse in Holloway II, the Smallwood deci-
sion has other problems which prevent its applicability to issues of
domestic abuse. The Smallwood court first identified behavior
within the tenant's control, such as Smallwood knowingly keeping
prohibited dogs for four years,93 and then used that behavior to
impute to the tenant responsibility for the acts of third parties,
such as the bullet hole in her house from someone shooting at the
animals.94 Even if pet ownership was construed as a constructive
invitation to neighbors to shoot at the pet, that interpretive
framework would work grave injustice where the tenant is a vic-
tim of abuse. To be consistent, a Smallwood holding in Margaret's
case,95 for instance, would have to consider Margaret's participa-
tion in the relationship a natural precursor to the criminal as-
sault 96-an unacceptable outcome.
87. Appellant's Reply Brief at 20, Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Holloway,
No. CO-94-736, 1994 WL 638084 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1994) [hereinafter
"Holloway I"].
88. See Smallwood, 379 N.W.2d at 555.
89. Id. at 555-56.
90. Id. at 556.
91. See supra part I.B.2 (noting that victims are generally unable to foresee or
prevent domestic violence).
92. Victims of abuse cannot prevent abusive partners from violating lease pro-
visions. The "control" in abusive relationships is exercised by the abuser, not the
victim. See supra note 50 and text accompanying note 27.
93. See supra notes 81-83.
94. See supra note 81.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
96. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing the fallacy that
victims provoke abuse).
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2. Entrenchment of Strict Liability: Holloway
A decade after deciding Smallwood, the court of appeals had
before it another tenant facing eviction in Minneapolis Public
Housing Authority v. Holloway.97 Recognizing the lack of control
the tenant had over the events surrounding the alleged lease viola-
tions, the tenant's attorney in Holloway 11 asked the court to adopt
a standard for evictions based on the tenant's ability to foresee,
prevent or control the lease violations. 98 By failing to recognize
factual dissimilarities with Smallwood and misinterpreting federal
regulations, the court not only rejected the tenant's proffered
standard but established strict liability as the applicable eviction
standard. 99
As an unpublished opinion, Holloway 11 does not create
binding precedent. 100 Minnesota's trial courts, especially those
faced with domestically abusive tenants, have nevertheless looked
to Holloway 11 for authoritative guidance.10 1
In Holloway II, the court of appeals made three crucial ana-
lytical mistakes while affirming the grant of an eviction against a
public housing tenant. The first mistake occurred in the court's
reading of a federal housing regulation. The court erred a second
time in failing to recognize the tenant's innocence in the lease vio-
lations. The court made a third mistake when it failed to examine
fairly the tenant's proposed foreseeability test.
First, the court adopted an unnecessarily rigid interpretation
of a federally assisted housing regulation. 10 2 The pertinent part of
the regulation obligates tenants "to cause the household and
guests to refrain from destroying, defacing, [or] damaging ... the
dwelling unit."0 3 The Holloway I court essentially ignored the
97. Holloway II, No. C0-95-391, 1995 WL 479653 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
1995).
98. See Appellant's Brief at 36-39, Holloway I, No. CO-94-736, 1994 WL 638084
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1994).
99. See Holloway II, No. C0-95-391, 1995 WL 479653, at *2 (holding that "[tihe
eviction standard for public housing does not ask whether the tenant could
'reasonably foresee, prevent, or control' the incidents that caused the eviction. The
standard is more strict. The tenant is responsible for the acts of family and
guests.").
100. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08(c) (1996) ("Unpublished opinions of the court of
appeals are not precedential.").
101. See, e.g., Phillips Neighborhood Hous. Trust v. Brown, No. 960705508 (4th
Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
102. See Holloway 11, 1995 WL 479653, at *2 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(9)
(1993)).
103. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(0(9) (1993) (emphasis added). The relevant portions have
not changed for 1996. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(9) (1996).
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"cause" element, important for all tenants and crucial for victims
of domestic abuse, by interpreting the relevant language to mean
"[t]he tenant is responsible for the acts of family and guests."'104
This reading of the regulation essentially means that the court will
always find a tenant responsible, no matter how innocent or non-
involved with the lease violation. Reading the regulation without
a cause safeguard will mean that a domestic abuse victim, who has
not "caused" her partner's abusive behavior,105 will nevertheless be
told that she "is responsible" for the behavior.
The court made another mistake by conflating the events that
transpired on or near Ms. Holloway's residence without separately
evaluating her culpability in them.106 The Holloway II court relies
on the trial court's finding that eviction was justified on the basis
of a "pattern of personal violence and property damage."'107 The
Holloway II court thus mimics a tactic used by the Smallwood
court-the aggregation of seemingly unfavorable facts to justify
eviction. 0 8 A closer look at Holloway Irs facts reveals that, unlike
Smallwood, the events in Holloway II were largely a product of
the neighborhood in which Ms. Holloway lived.
The incidents involving weapons provide good examples of
this; the court blames Ms. Holloway because her house was fire-
bombed, because her house and children were shot at and because
her son made threats with a toy gun. 0 9 The court seemed un-
moved by the fact that police indicated to Ms. Holloway that the
shooting and fire-bombing were the work of gang members retali-
ating against her children for not joining the gang"10 and that more
104. See Holloway II, No. C0-95-391, 1995 WL 479653, at *2 (emphasis added).
105. See supra Part I.B.2 (noting that victims are generally unable to prevent
domestic violence). See also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. The court in
"Margaret's" case recognized that victims are not responsible for the acts of perpe-
trators and thus refused to hold the tenant accountable for lease violations under
the theory that she "permitted" domestic violence. West Bank Homes v. 'M.K.,"
No. 1891221520, slip op. at 3 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Jan 22, 1990).
106. The court also dismissed Holloway's claim of innocence. See Appellant's
Reply Brief at 17, Holloway I, No. C0-94-736, 1994 WL 638084 (Minn. Ct. App.)
("Ms. Holloway clearly asserted that she could not have done anything to avoid the
events that occurred.").
107. Holloway II, No. C0-95-391, 1995 WL 479653, at *2. The Housing Author-
ity attributed the following incidents to Holloway: "a bicycle being thrown through
a door; windows and walls being broken; two drive-by shootings; threats with a
realistic toy gun by Holloway's son; [and] fire-bombing of the house .. " Id. at *1.
108. See supra notes 80-81.
109. See. Holloway II, NO. C0-95-391, 1995 WL 479653, at *1.
110. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 20 n.4, Holloway I, No. C0-94-736, 1994 WL
638084 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1994).
[Vol. 15:471
HOUSING AND DOMESTIC ABUSE
than one house was firebombed."' Under these facts, Ms. Hollo-
way appears to have been no more than a victim of what her at-
torney called a "battering neighborhood." 12 He described the area
as "one in which houses get firebombed and people think toy guns
are real."113 As evidence that Ms. Holloway did not consent to the
violent nature of her neighborhood, her attorney pointed out that
she asked the housing authority to relocate her to a safer area.
114
The Holloway II court made a third mistake by including
problematic dicta stating that appellant's proposed foreseeability
test would not have prevented Holloway's eviction.115 In so rea-
soning, the court applied the foreseeability test to only two inci-
dents on the Holloway property. The court called the first inci-
dent, a drive-by shooting that occurred after Holloway left town
and put her nephew in charge of the house, a "prime example" of
an event which the tenant should have foreseen.116 The court does
not explain how Holloway could have foreseen an event that oc-
curred in her absence. It merely found Holloway liable by stating,
"[w]hile Holloway could not have foreseen the shooting, she is re-
sponsible for her nephew's actions because she placed him in con-
trol of the house."117 The court thus did not, as promised, find that
Holloway could have foreseen the shooting." 8
111. Interview with Lawrence R. McDonough, supra note 76. Mr. McDonough




115. "Even if this court were to adopt Holloway's standard, the facts permit a
reasonable inference that Holloway could have or should have foreseen some of the
situations even if she could not envision the exact events." Holloway II, No. CO-95-
391, 1995 WL 479653, at *2.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. Ms. Holloway's attorney noted that no argument was made that Ms.
Holloway left the house in the control of an irresponsible person. Interview with
Lawrence R. McDonough, supra note 76.
118. As further evidence that she had no way to foresee the shooting, Holloway
noted that the police indicated to her that gang members may have perpetrated
the violence against her children because they did not join the gang. See supra
note 110 and accompanying text. It seems counter-intuitive that her children's
non-involvement in gang activity would give Holloway more reason to foresee a
drive-by shooting. The court's implication that Holloway's liability for violent ac-
tivity remained unchanged when her children actively sought to avoid it creates
bad housing policy. The court essentially discourages tenants from trying to pre-
vent any disruptive behavior by assigning them responsibility for all of it. See Ap-
pellant's Reply Brief at 21, Holloway I, No. CO-94-736, 1994 WL 638084 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 15, 1994) (arguing that a foreseeability standard "sends a signal to ten-
ants that they must take action to prevent conduct within their control which
might constitute lease violations").
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The second incident the court cited was a verbal confronta-
tion between Holloway and her boyfriend which ended with him
breaking windows and putting holes in walls."l 9 Instead of being
concerned with her safety, the court paternalistically informed Ms.
Holloway that she should have foreseen that "heated arguments"
with her boyfriend can lead to violence. 120 If the court remains
loyal to its heated argument explanation, a victim of abuse ap-
pearing before the court may find it difficult to convince the court
that she did not participate in an argument, even though many in-
stances of domestic violence occur without any foreseeable insti-
gating event.121 The court also blamed Holloway for not acting as
she watched her boyfriend "[break] numerous windows and put
holes in some walls."'122 This attitude will prove disastrous to the
first domestic abuse victim who tries to explain to the court that
she could not control her abuser's behavior.
3. The Potential Disastrous Effects of Strict Liability for
Victims of Domestic Abuse: Brown
The court of appeals recently heard oral arguments in Phil-
lips Neighborhood Housing Trust v. Brown.123 The outcome of this
eviction case may reveal how much damage Smallwood's unfavor-
able facts and Holloway Ifs entrenchment of strict liability will in-
flict on those in a position similar to victims of domestic abuse.
In Brown, the tenant and her adult son signed a public
housing lease together. 124 As an attempt to establish some control
over her son, Ms. Brown had not wanted her son to be a signatory,
but rather a member of the household like her two minor daugh-
ters.125 When police found illegal drugs in the home allegedly be-
longing to the son, the property manager sought to evict the entire
household. 126
Ms. Brown's life with her adult son in at least two ways re-
sembled an abusive relationship. First, Ms. Brown could not con-
trol her son's behavior. 127 Second, the son committed violent acts
119. Holloway II, No. C0-95-391, 1995 WL 479653, at *2.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 39-40 (noting examples of domestic violence not preceded
by any foreseeable instigating event).
122. Holloway II, No. CO-95-391, 1995 WL 479653, at *2.
123. No. 960705508, slip op. (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
124. Id.
125. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Brown, No. 960705508.
126. See Brown, No. 960705508, slip op. at 3.
127. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Brown, No. 960705508. See supra Part I.B.2
(explaining that a victim of domestic abuse cannot control an abuser's conduct).
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towards his mother, sisters and his girlfriend. 128 He threatened to
damage the apartment if he did not get the larger bedroom, 129 he
threatened household members with a gun when they objected to
his girlfriend moving in130 and at another time Ms. Brown's son
"became wild, hitting Ms. Brown with his blue jeans."'131
Although the housing court referee found facts favorably to
the tenant,13 2 she felt compelled to follow the strict liability stan-
dard solidified in Holloway 11 and its interpretation of federal
regulations. 133 The district court affirmed the referee's order.
3 4
A court of appeals decision affirming the eviction would dem-
onstrate vividly the impropriety of a strict liability standard. That
test provides no responsiveness to each tenant's special circum-
stances. The standard for deciding eviction cases most equitably
for all tenants would involve an evaluation of each tenant's ability
to foresee, prevent or control the situation that caused the lease
violation. If the tenant could neither foresee nor prevent the lease
violations, the court should deny the landlord's eviction request.
B. Minnesota Should Adopt a "Foreseeability" Standard
The Smallwood standard of liability, which may have worked
with the facts of that case, produced the wrong result in a case like
Brown, where the victim of a household member's abusive behav-
128. See Brown, No. 960705508 (Minn. Aug. 19, 1996) (Referee's Decision and
Order). Although Ms. Brown suffered no physical injuries when her son struck his
girlfriend, this could have put her in fear of being struck. See infra note 195. Ms.
Brown also obtained an Order for Protection, discussed infra Part IV.A, restrain-
ing her son from having any contact with the rest of the family. See Brown, No.
960705508 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 19, 1996) (Referee's Decision and Order at 5).
129. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Brown, No. 960705508 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn.
Oct. 15, 1996).
130. Interview with Lawrence R. McDonough, Attorney for Mary Brown, supra
note 76.
131. See Brief for Appellant at 6, Brown, No. 960705508.
132. In her Memorandum, the referee expressed disapproval of the Housing
Authority's refusal to enter into a new lease with just Ms. Brown and her daugh-
ters. See Phillips Neighborhood Hous. Trust v. Brown, No. 960705508 (4th Dist.
Ct. Minn. Aug. 19, 1996) (Referee's Memorandum at 9-10). The referee also ex-
pressed reluctance in having to order the eviction: "The result here may and does
appear harsh. Indeed, the facts alleged and proven by the [housing authority] de-
pict Ms. Brown as somewhat of a victim herself. The Plaintiff has presented no
evidence that Ms. Brown bears any more culpability than, probably, any parent of
a wrongdoing adult child." Id.
133. See Brown, No. 960705508 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 19, 1996) (Referee's
Decision and Order at 7). As evidence of the referee's direct reliance on Holloway
1I, she cited the 1993 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations, as used in Hollo-
way II, instead of the current version. Id. For a discussion of Holloway I's inter-
pretation of the regulations, see supra text accompanying notes 102-105.
134. See Brown, No. 960705508, slip op. at 1 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
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ior finds herself victimized again by a court that adheres to a strict
liability standard. Instead, a standard providing tenants protec-
tion from evictions based on lease violations they cannot foresee,
prevent or control provides a better fit with the existing statutory
schemes for both public and private housing.
1. Federally Assisted Housing
The United States government entered the housing market
with the promise to "remedy ... the acute shortage of decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings for families of low income." 135 To that end,
it developed two standards for eviction from federally assisted
housing. When a housing authority initiates eviction proceedings
on the basis of criminal activity on the rental property, Congress
authorized removal of the tenant or anyone living in a unit where
such crime takes place, 136 unless the tenant was without "control"
over the person committing the crime. 137 The legislative history of
this section indicates that Congress had additional defenses of
"knowledge" and "prevention" in mind for public housing ten-
ants. 138 The foreseeability standard advocated for Minnesota, by
asking whether the tenant could foresee, prevent or control lease
violations, aligns squarely with the policy behind this criminal ac-
tivity standard. 139 Moreover, Minnesota has incorporated similar
tenant protection into its laws by providing that the statutory
"covenant of lessee not to allow drugs," required of all residential
135. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 1 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(/)(5); 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)(ii)(A,B) (1996) (applying the
statute to "any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants").
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5).
138. See S. REP. No. 101-316, at 179 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5763, 5941 (asking for the public housing agency's "humane judgment" and opining
that "eviction would not be the appropriate course if the tenant had no knowledge
of the criminal activities of his/her guests or had taken reasonable steps under the
circumstances to prevent the activity"). Similarly, with regard to subsidized
housing tenants, Congress "assume[d] that if the tenant had no knowledge of the
criminal activity or took reasonable steps to prevent it, then good cause to evict
the innocent family members would not exi[s]t." Id.
139. Congress aimed this standard primarily at drug offenses. Prior to the ad-
dition of the criminal standard in 1988, the government expressed dissatisfaction
with the previous efforts to address the drug problem in public housing. See Dean
P. Cazenave, Congress Steps Up War on Drugs in Public Housing: Has It Gone One
Step Too Far?, 36 LOY. L. REV. 137, 138-39 (1990). Although Congress berated
drug users, no one thought to blame victims of domestic violence for the decay of
public housing. See Lisa Weil, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing: Con-
gress'Addiction to a Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & PoLY' REv. 161, 161-69 (1991). In fact,
Congress gives preferential treatment to housing applicants displaced by domestic
abuse. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 5.420(b)(4).
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leases, is violated only if the tenant "knew or had reason to know"
of drug activity. 140
Congress also established a standard of "serious or repeated
violation" of lease terms or other "good cause" when a public
housing agency attempts to evict tenants for non-criminal con-
duct. 41 The implementing regulations of the federal act provide
further tenant protection by expanding the statute's reach to cover
lease renewal as well as termination, and by requiring lease viola-
tions to touch "material" provisions of the lease. 142 Congress ap-
plied "good cause" and "serious and repeated violation" protection
to subsidized housing as well.143
Although courts nationwide presently engage in fact-specific
decision-making to determine whether a tenant's non-criminal be-
havior gives the housing agency good cause for eviction, their con-
clusions form a pattern of tenant responsibility analogous to the
proposed foreseeability test for Minnesota. For example, courts
have upheld findings of good cause where the tenant had failed to
remove pets from her apartment 44 and where the tenant allowed
unsanitary garbage accumulation in her unit,145 while other courts
have held that good cause was not established by a tenant's son's
fights and alleged sexual misconduct 146 and when a tenant failed
to pay a month's rent due to the theft of a money order. 147 The
first two cases address autonomous tenant behavior, while the lat-
ter two address undesirable activity not directly ascribable to the
tenant. Minnesota's proposed test likewise focuses on third-party
behavior by asking whether the victim could foresee or control the
lease violation.
State courts outside of Minnesota have long made this in-
quiry. In North Carolina, a court dismissed a housing authority's
eviction proceeding based on a tenant's children's criminal behav-
ior. 148 The court noted the inequity of evicting a tenant "not per-
sonally at fault."149 Similarly, a New York court called the eviction
140. MINN. STAT. § 504.181(1) (1996).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d()(4).
142. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2) (1996).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1).
144. Fitzpatrick v. Pierce, 553 F. Supp. 167 (D. Mass. 1982).
145. Greenwich Gardens Ass'ns v. Pitt, 484 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1984).
146. North Shore Plaza Ass'ns v. Guida, 459 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1983).
147. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Green, 536 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
148. Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
The criminal activity included auto larceny, breaking and entering, assault with a
deadly weapon and murder. Id. at 70.
149. Id. at 72-73. See also Maxton Hous. Auth. v. McLean, 328 S.E.2d 290 (N.C.
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of a tenant for the actions of her sons "shocking to one's sense of
fairness,"'5 0 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court15 ' stated that
the housing agency could not terminate the tenant's lease if
"special circumstances indicat[ed] that she could not foresee or
prevent the violence."'152
Courts also tacitly utilize the test proposed for Minnesota
when they refuse evictions where no minimal connection exists be-
tween tenant and lease violation. In one case an Illinois appellate
court found that the tenant had no minimal connection to her son's
possession of drug paraphernalia because she had no knowledge of
his use drug use. 15 3 In a New York case, 15 4 the court held that no
"causal nexus existed" between lease violations and the tenant's
behavior 55 when the eviction was based on criminal activity of the
tenant's children who were not living with tenant when the objec-
tionable behavior occurred. 156
When Minnesota courts have allowed housing agencies to
evict tenants for such disruptive behavior as cars driven on
lawns 157 or bicycles thrown through doors, 58 the issue of whether
the tenant was involved in the incidents goes unaddressed. In-
stead, the court adds these incidents to lists of misconduct used to
justify the lease termination. 5 9 When the tenant is a victim of
1985) (holding no "good cause" shown when tenant was not personally responsible
for non payment of rent); accord Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Green, 536
N.E.2d 1.
150. Baldwin v. New York City Hous. Auth., 408 N.Y.S.2d 948, 948 (1978).
151. Spence v. Gormley, 387 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1982). The conduct in issue in
Spence included a child firebombing a neighboring tenant and committing racially-
motivated assault. Id. at 743. Massachusetts law at the time required only a
finding of "cause." Id. at 745. This provides arguably less protection than the cur-
rent federal good cause requirement.
152. Id. The court observed:
If an adult member of the household is uncontrollable and likely to com-
mit serious acts of violence, the tenant reasonably could refuse to permit
him to stay with her, and could seek outside help in preventing his con-
tinued presence. When a tenant has taken such measures, she has done
all she can, and should not be held responsible for violence that never-
theless occurs.
Id. at 746. Six years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clarified
that upholding the eviction in Spence was not intended to create a presumption
that tenants can foresee or prevent the actions of household members. Hodess v.
Bonefont, 519 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Mass. 1988).
153. Diversified Realty Group v. Davis, 628 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (L1. App. CL 1993).
154. Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (1974).
155. Id. at 519.
156. Id. at 516.
157. See supra note 80.
158. See supra text accompanying note 107.
159. See supra note 80; supra text accompanying note 107.
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domestic abuse who may feel that she does not exist, 160 or who
may be attacked when she is sleeping, 161 it would truly "shock
one's sense of fairness"'162 to assign her personal responsibility for
disturbing the neighbors.
An victim who is awake has no greater capacity to foresee or
prevent violence which violates the lease, 163 and courts in other ju-
risdictions have held foresight a prerequisite to lease termina-
tion.164 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, 165 in speaking of "an
adult member of the household [who] is uncontrollable and likely
to commit serious acts of violence,"1 66 might as well have been ad-
dressing domestic abusers. Not only can victims not control their
violent partners, 67 often the partners can completely control the
victims. 68 While it is not clear what the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals would do if it acknowledged the special situation of a tenant
as victim of abuse, courts across the country would refuse eviction
of tenants like Margaret from public or subsidized housing.
Similarly, framing the foreseeability standard in terms of a
"minimal connection" or "causal nexus"'169 would defeat the at-
tempted eviction of domestic abuse victims. First, if domestic vio-
lence is gender based, 70 that is, perpetrated against women be-
cause they are women, a victim's gender provides the only
connection to the lease violation. Second, if most victims cannot
leave an abusive home or relationship, 17 1 their staying does not
signal their involvement or approval of the lease-violating vio-
lence.
2. Private Housing
Absent public housing's regulatory scheme, lease provisions
in private housing giving rise to eviction 72 will vary as tenants
160. See supra note 27.
161. See supra note 39; Moundsville Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341, 342
(W. Va. 1988).
162. Baldwin v. New York City Hous. Auth., 408 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1978).
163. See supra notes 39-42 (noting that, among other factors, absence of any
provocation means that victims cannot foresee abusive behavior).
164. See supra notes 151-52.
165. Spence v. Gormley, 439 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1982).
166. Id. at 746.
167. See supra note 92.
168. See supra Parts I.B.3.a, I.B.3.b (noting perpetrators use of financial abuse
and separation assault to control victims).
169. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 33-34.
171. See supra Part I.B.3.
172. Minnesota requires that a landlord may bring an eviction action only if the
1997] 495
Law and Inequality
contract with landlords for shelter. 73 Minnesota needs to expand
its private housing law to assure that the proposed foreseeability
standard can provide domestic abuse victims relief from eviction
for an abuser's behavior. It could accomplish this either legisla-
tively or judicially.
Minnesota's present eviction statute affords private tenants
less protection than federally assisted tenants 74 because it does
not contain the "good cause" element that courts outside of Minne-
sota have used to require findings of personal responsibility for
lease violations. 175 In reforming its statute, Minnesota should look
to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act 176 for guidance. This act pre-
vents private evictions unless the court finds "good cause" from a
number of circumstances, including that the tenant "has willfully
or by reason of gross negligence caused or allowed destruction,
damage or injury to the premises."' 77 Such a clause would assist
abuse victims because they do not "allow" their partner's behav-
ior.1 78 The foreseeability standard would attach to the willful re-
quirement of the act. Since willful actions require knowledge and
volition,1 79 domestic abuse victims should argue that their inability
to foresee or control 80 prevents them from having the level of
knowledge necessary for "willfulness."
lease provides the landlord with such a right, called "re-entry," for lease violations.
See Bauer v. Knoble, 53 N.W. 805, 805 (Minn. 1892).
173. Some commentators have suggested that it feels "unnatural" for one person
to have to bargain with another for permission to occupy territory. See ARTHUR
BERNEY ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR 97 (1975) ("[Ylou are undone if you
once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to no-
body. "'), quoting JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF
INEQUALITY (1974).
174. Compare MINN. STAT. § 566.03(4) (1996) (authorizing eviction for "a viola-
tion by the tenant" of a private lease provision) with 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(/)(4) (1994)
(authorizing eviction for "serious or repeated violation" of a public lease provision).
175. For a discussion of several such cases, see supra text accompanying notes
144-156.
176. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
177. Id. § 2A:18-61.1b.
178. See note 30 (supporting the proposition that adults do not choose to be
abused). See also American Apartment Mgmt. Co. v. Phillips, 653 N.E.2d 834 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995). In Phillips, one of the tenant's guests brought crack cocaine into
the residence without tenant's approval or knowledge. Id. at 835-36. The lease
forbade the tenant from "permitting" the residence to be used for criminal activity.
Id. at 837. Defining "permit" as "to consent to expressly or formally," the Illinois
Court of Appeals found that the tenant did not have the requisite knowledge to
have "permitted" a lease violation. Id. at 840-41 (citing Chicago Hous. Auth. v.
Rose, 560 N.E.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). Under Phillips' definition of
"permit," a woman never "expressly consents" to being beaten. See supra Part I.B.1.
179. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990) ("Proceeding from a con-
scious motion of the will; ... knowingly").
180. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Until the legislature acts, Minnesota courts must work within
the current statute, which provides possible aid to victims of do-
mestic abuse by stating that landlords may only evict tenants for
lease violations "by the tenant."'181 Advocates for domestic abuse
victims facing eviction based on the conduct of an abuser should
argue that the violations were not "by the tenant." This argument
applies, both when a non-tenant partner commits lease violations
in the victim's unit and when both parties are tenants,182 if the vic-
tim's representative can help the court see beyond the myth that
victims create violent confrontations. 183 The victim's advocate,
however, may have more difficulty convincing a court that lease
violations were not committed "by the tenant" when the parties
live together because of the instinctive reaction that if the victim
did not leave the situation, she must have approved of and partici-
pated in it.184
IV. Evicting the Cause, Not the Victim
The previous section argued for a standard that would pre-
vent a landlord from evicting a victim of abuse for lease violations
caused by the abuser. This works best where the lease contains
the names of only innocent parties, that is, when the victim lives
alone or with children, and the abuser has entered the premises,
as in Margaret's case. If the victim and abuser live together how-
ever, both having signed the lease, they would both lose a home if
an eviction terminates that lease. As only one tenant has caused
the lease violation, Minnesota should allow a method of removing
only the abuser to supplement the victim's eviction defense.
A. Limitations of the Order for Protection
Minnesota's present method for removing a batterer from a
household is contained in its Domestic Abuse Act. 8 5 The statute
allows courts to "exclude the abusing party from the dwelling
181. See MINN. STAT. § 566.03(4) (1996). This section also provides a defense to
victims in case a landlord tries to collect for damage to the apartment from an
abuser's actions. The statute makes tenants liable only if "a person acting under
the tenant's discretion or control" caused the damage. Id.
182. See infra Part IV. for a discussion of the abuser as co-tenant.
183. See supra Part I.B.2.
184. See supra Part I.B.3; see also supra note 6 (explaining the difficulty legal
practitioners have overcoming such "self-protective expectations").
185. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (1996). This statute applies to, among others,
persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the
past..." and covers both physical and emotional injury. Id. § 518B.01(2)(a)-(b).
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which the parties share."'186 To access this remedy, a victim must
file a petition for an Order for Protection ("OFP"). 187 The main
weakness of the otherwise powerful Domestic Abuse Actl88 is found
in the requirements for granting OFPs. The Act instructs the vic-
tim to state "specific facts and circumstances" in an affidavit under
oath. 189 The victim must show a present harm to herself or a
threat thereof; 90 while past abuse may be a factor, it is not dis-
positive. 191 The court of appeals has raised the threshold for alle-
gations by interpreting the Domestic Abuse Act to require the
woman to show "some overt action" by the abuser and that he
"intended" to put her in fear of imminent harm. 192
There are two problems with the statute's language and the
court's interpretation. First, the Legislature intended that courts
apply the domestic abuse statute with a preventive goal.193 Per-
haps the Legislature realized that some women may be unwilling
or unable to pursue other remedies like filing criminal charges,
tort claims or divorce proceedings. 194 However, since some victims
may endure much suffering before they can present evidence of
present harm, the judiciary's imminence requirement strips the
Domestic Abuse Act of its prophylactic character. Furthermore,
because violence is merely one facet of abusive behavior, a woman
may be abused even when no one is violent towards her.195
186. Id. § 518B.01(6)(a)(2). This provision does not allow a judge to exclude the
victim from the residence. See Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992).
187. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4) (1996).
188. The Domestic Abuse Act allows for warrantless arrest of an abuser who
violates an OFP by being on the couple's shared premises. MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01(14)(b) (1996). Police, however, often do not enforce such provisions with
much vigor. See Zorza, supra note 11, at 422.
189. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4)(b).
190. See Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
191. See Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
192. See Kass, 355 N.W.2d at 337. The court of appeals has also potentially ex-
panded protection, however, by holding that a victim does not have to show an
overt physical act. Knuth v. Knuth, No. Cl-92-482, 1992 WL 145387 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 30, 1992). Thus a verbal threat may suffice to inflict fear of imminent
harm. Id. at *1 (quoting Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
Despite this glint of emancipation, the courts have left the OFP with potentially
restrictive conditions.
193. See Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ('As
a remedial statute, the Domestic Abuse Act receives liberal construction.... The
construction of the statute may not be expanded in a way that does not advance its
remedial purpose.").
194. See State v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681, 682 (Minn. 1981).
195. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 23, at 25. See also supra note 6 (distinguish-
ing "abuse" and "violence"); Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 14 ('Recognizing not
just who is hit, but who is afraid of being hit, creates a more accurate picture of
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Second, even if a victim of abuse suffers the kind of harm the
court of appeals has enumerated, she may be unable to present to
the court, under oath, the specific facts the statute requires. 196
Reasons for this differ. According to the theory of "learned help-
lessness,"197 a victim's lack of faith that her individual efforts will
have any positive consequences might prevent a victim from even
attempting to obtain an OFP. In a slightly different context, that
of giving evidence at trial, Klein and Orloff note that a woman's
testimony, while potentially the strongest evidence of the existence
of domestic abuse, may be impaired by the victim's fear. 198
Even if the woman does make it to the courthouse, embar-
rassment, 199 a desire to protect the abuser's public reputation 200 or
an unconscious minimization of the abuse 201 may render her un-
able to allege specific facts. Further, a "posttraumatic stress reac-
tion" can prevent some victims from "thinking, feeling, or remem-
bering" violent incidents.20 2 A victim may also run into problems
in the procedural phases of the application. It has been suggested
that the clerk, whose task it is to assist victims in completing this
form, may try to derail the process. 20 3 Minnesota should consider
two approaches to assist in the eviction of only the abuser.
B. Common Law Solution
Under the first approach, which would not require legislative
intervention, a court could enter judgment in the eviction pro-
ceeding in favor of the landlord with respect to the party responsi-
victimization.").
196. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4)(b). Some victims falsely believe they need an
attorney to fill out a petition. See Buel, supra note 13, at 17.
197. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (explaining one understand-
ing of "learned helplessness").
198. Klein & Orloff, supra note 23, at 28. See also supra text accompanying
notes 52-53 (describing the fear some abuse victims experience).
199. See WALKER, supra note 7, at 135 ('Paulette decided that she was too em-
barrassed to talk at a public hearing about the terrible things that had been done
to her. She chose to plead guilty and stay in prison, perhaps for the rest of her life,
rather than expose her experiences of degradation and violent sexual abuse.").
200. See Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 16.
201. See Frederick, supra note 27, at 2.
202. See Dutton & Waltz, supra note 7, at 16. See also Frederick, supra note 27,
at 2 ("[A victim] may have trouble distinguishing any violent incident from the
rest, remembering dates or details.").
203. See MINNESOTA LEGAL SERV. COALITION, GETTING PROTECTION FROM
ABUSE AND HARASSMENT: A GUIDE FOR OBTAINING COURT ORDERS 7 (1995).
"Sometimes the clerk at the courthouse may tell you that you do not qualify for an
OFP. They will sometimes do this if you have not lived with the abuser for long,
but the law protects you if you have ever lived together. Clerks have no right to
screen applicants .. " Id.
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ble for breaching a lease provision, the perpetrator of the domestic
abuse, but would deny relief to the landlord with respect to the in-
nocent party, the victim of the abuse. This is sound policy as it
merely expands on the idea that only culpable parties should be
evicted: in the assisted housing eviction, the landlord could re-
move only the tenant he or she has good cause to evict,20 4 and in
the private housing eviction, the landlord could evict only the ten-
ant who has materially violated the lease. 205
At least one court has adopted this approach. In Akron Met-
ropolitan Housing Authority v. Rice,20 6 an Ohio trial court held
that it could enter judgment on an eviction against one household
member but not the rest of the family, which was innocent in the
matter. This could aid a victim whose partner's violent acts create
grounds for eviction, but who cannot obtain an OFP that excludes
the man from the dwelling. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has a
similar case pending before it now. 207
Minnesota courts could also find support for the idea of en-
tering judgment against only one household member from Minne-
sota's real property forfeiture statute, which allows landlords to
evict tenants when controlled substances are seized in the rental
unit.20 8 The statute allows tenants to raise a defense to the evic-
tion proceeding that they had no knowledge of the controlled sub-
stance's presence or could not prevent its entry into the apart-
ment. 209 In a landlord's action to remove a couple for lease
violations caused by domestic violence, both defenses borrowed
from the property forfeiture statute would greatly assist a court in
justifying the removal of only the abuser. 210
First, for a defense of lack of knowledge in the forfeiture stat-
ute, if a party is aware of his or her co-tenant's illicit drug opera-
tions, a court implicates the party by inferring that the party ap-
proved of and participated in the operation. In the domestic abuse
situation, however, even when a victim has knowledge of her part-
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(4).
205. See MINN. STAT. § 566.03(4) (1996).
206. No. 88-CV-04013 (Ohio Mun. Ct., Akron, filed June 22, 1988) (cited in Case
Developments, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 300, 322 (1989)).
207. See supra Part II.A.l.c for a discussion of Phillips Neighborhood Housing
Trust v. Brown, No. 960705508, slip op. (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
208. MINN. STAT. § 609.5317(1)(a-b) (1996).
209. Id. § 609.5317(3).
210. A federal district court has used a federal statute similar in relevant lan-
guage to Minnesota's to remove an adult grandchild who sold drugs from the
apartment and to allow the grandmother to remain in the unit because she lacked
knowledge of the drug activity. See United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F.
Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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ner's conduct, the implied approval and participation are absent.
Thus, a court would find that a victim had "notice" of the abuse,
but that, implied approval, the aspect of "knowledge" that makes it
incriminating is missing.
Second, the statute's defense of inability to prevent a co-
tenant's actions seems tailor-made for the domestic abuse setting.
Victims generally cannot control abusers' behavior.2 11 In each in-
stance, a court could consider evidence of the victim's physical
stature and economic standing relative to the abuser and examine
the history of abuse within the relationship to satisfy its desire to
objectively determine whether the victim could have prevented the
lease violation by controlling the abuser.
C. Statutory Remedies
Amendments to the Domestic Abuse Act designed to facilitate
one-party evictions could augment the common-law solutions sug-
gested above. For example, Minnesota could amend the Act to al-
low a victim to remove the abuser, like an eviction, rather than
leave it up to the court to exclude a party. This would give the vic-
tim an option in situations where the landlord chooses not to ter-
minate the tenancy of the abuser despite lease violations of distur-
bance of neighbors or property damage. However, it would
preserve the problems of the OFP in leaving the victim to take the
initiative and carry the burden of proof.212 The Act might also be
amended to allow landlords2 13 or third parties to provide the spe-
cific information necessary for an OFP.
The path recommended by these statutory and common law
measures would facilitate the removal of a woman's abusive part-
ner from the shared rental unit, but may put the woman at risk of
homelessness if she lacks the financial resources to cover the
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89.
213. Landlords have certain responsibilities to take action when the safety or
comfort of their tenants is in jeopardy. For example, in Person v. Torchwood
Mgmt., No. UD 1920604543 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. July 6, 1992), "abusive language"
and "unjustified harassment" by neighboring tenants adversely affected the plain-
tiff's use and enjoyment of her dwelling. Id. The court noted that the landlord
occupied a position of some power to "abate the nuisancefs]," and stated that the
landlord must "make reasonable and good faith efforts" to do so. Id.
Statutory duties also attach regarding tenant safety. St. Paul, Minnesota, for
example, requires one-inch dead-bolt locks on all apartment doors leading to the
outside. ST. PAuL LEGIS. CODE § 34.09(3)(i). See also MINNEAPOLIS CODE
§ 244.675 (requiring security doors that lock automatically for egress and ingress
to all multiple dwelling buildings).
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abuser's share of the rent.214 Landlords may be less willing to
support a one-party eviction if it hampers their rent collection.
Minnesota should therefore enact measures to ensure that no in-
nocent party-the victim or landlord-will bear the cost after re-
moval of an abuser from the home.
V. Protecting Private Landlords
After a victim has removed the batterer with an OFP or a
one-party eviction, she may have trouble staying current with rent
without the batterer's resources. Minnesota needs to recognize a
theory under which an evicted abuser, while removed from the
landlord's property, remains liable with the victim for rental obli-
gations. One solution, closely aligned with present legislative pol-
icy, would involve an action against the abuser in restitution.
Illinois recently amended its criminal code to require con-
victed batterers to reimburse the expenses domestic violence shel-
ters may have had to incur while serving the batterer's victim. 215
Minnesota could adopt analogous legislation requiring excluded
batterers to pay "restitution" to landlords (effectively serving as
shelters) for any lost rent they may incur. Although Minnesota
tenants are presumed jointly liable for the covenant to pay rent, it
would be manifestly unfair to expect victims to continue to meet
each month's full rent, particularly where the abuser had kept the
victim from supporting herself.216 At the same time, batterers do
not suffer unjustly under this scheme, even if they have to face two
rental obligations. Assaults such as the kind they inflict on their
intimate partners, 217 if committed on any other member of society,
would surely warrant the assaulter's incarceration if not institu-
tionalization.
Minnesota would not need to legislate in radically new terri-
tory to provide rent relief to victims of abuse. The Domestic Abuse
Act comes very close to providing this type of relief by allowing the
court to "order the abusing party to pay restitution to the
[victim]."218 This payment to the victim for her physical suffering
could be recast in terms of restitution to landlords (as involuntary
214. See supra note 55 (discussing a victim's increased financial hardship after
separation from an abuser).
215. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515-5-6(b) (West 1996).
216. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining how abusers control
household finances); see supra note 27 (noting that many abusers prevent victims
from retaining employment).
217. See supra note 25.
218. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(6)(a)(10).
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guardians) for their lost profits. The Domestic Abuse Act also al-
lows courts to mandate continued insurance coverage and "in its
discretion, other relief."2 19
In one case, furthermore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in
essence allowed an abused wife to remain in exclusive possession
of the family home and not make mortgage payments.220 In that
case, the excluded husband had challenged the trial court's failure
to order payments from the wife, and the appellate court dismissed
this contention as "without merit."2 2 1 With this level of protection
already in place for victims, Minnesota could take the next step of
providing for rent substitution.
The amount of relief should vary with both parties' financial
circumstances. If the victim receives government benefits, those
benefits might increase when the abuser's contributions leave the
household. The government could withhold a portion of those
payments in the victim's name while the abuser paid rent and
could release the funds to the landlord should the abuser de-
fault.222 Alternatively, the government could provide the abuser's
219. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(6)(a)(1l)-(12).
220. See Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
221. See id.
222. Minnesota may also need to provide the victim protection against eviction
if she cannot regularly pay rent, for lack of government benefits or otherwise, and
the evicted abuser fails to contribute his share. The North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed a similar problem in the public housing context. See Maxton
Hous. Auth. v. McLean, 328 S.E.2d 290 (N.C. 1985). In Maxton, a tenant's
monthly rent increased from $0 to $171 because she married the father of her chil-
dren and he moved in. Id. at 291. The tenant's government benefits also termi-
nated upon the marriage, leaving her with no income, save her husband's earn-
ings. Id. at 294. The husband moved out of the apartment after the woman filed
assault charges against him. Id. The husband defaulted on his child support or-
der. Id. Thereafter, the housing authority sought to evict the tenant for nonpay-
ment of rent. Id. at 291. The court refused the eviction because the "fault" rested
with the husband, in that he was responsible for the increased rent and for its
nonpayment. Id. at 294. The court also stressed that since the tenant had "not
committed any wrongful acts," to evict her "would indeed shock one's sense of fair-
ness." Id.
The court expressly limited its decision to public housing leases, id., but Min-
nesota should nonetheless apply McLean's policy generally to the housing and do-
mestic abuse situation. Although the husband in McLean apparently moved out
on his own volition and thus seems objectively responsible for his wife's predica-
ment, an abusive spouse removed by the victim or a court effectively consents to
vacating the apartment by battering his partner. Just as the tenant in McLean
did not commit "wrongful acts," victims of abuse are just as innocent. See supra
Part I.B.1. The idea from McLean that landlords can only act against tenants at
fault for nonpayment of rent merits universal application. In short, the North
Carolina policy would assist a victim whose battering partner has been removed
from the shared household under an OFP, because the batterer's removal is his
fault, and the ensuing non payment of rent prompts an eviction against the victim.
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share of "restitution" to the landlord and then require the abuser
to make his payments to it. Providing such exceptional relief for
abuse victims would allow the victim to concentrate on healing
herself and her children while the state assumed responsibility for
pursuing delinquent abusers.
Conclusion
Women often enter relationships innocently and become
trapped by men who abuse them. A combination of reality and
psychology prevent them from leaving the abuser, whose behavior
often violates lease terms. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals
has failed to articulate a standard affording victims protection
against evictions in such situations.
Minnesota should adopt a foreseeability standard to assure
that innocent victims of domestic abuse have a defense to evictions
based on an abuser's actions. Courts must realize that although a
victim may live in an abusive home, or fail to prevent an abusive
partner from entering her apartment, the victim does not foresee
or sanction the lease violation. In addition, Minnesota should
supplement its Domestic Abuse Act with common law that allows
victims and courts more opportunities to remove an abuser from a
victim's home. Finally, Minnesota needs to consider methods of
collecting restitution from the removed abuser to assist the victim
in paying her rent.
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